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Necessaries-Common or Otherwise
By LELAND F. SEID*
SECTION 690 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the state of Cali-
fornia introduces the subject of property exempt from execution or
attachment,' stating:
The property mentioned in sections 690.1 to 690.25, inclusive, this
code, is exempt from execution or attachment, except as therein
otherwise specially provided, when claim for exemption is made to the
same by the judgment debtor or defendant as hereinafter in section
690.26 provided.
Code of Civil Procedure section 690.11 discusses earnings as one
item of exempt property:
One-half of the earnings of the defendant or judgment debtor received
for his personal services rendered at any time within 30 days next
preceding the levy of attachment or execution shall be exempt from
execution or attachment without filing a claim for exemption as pro-
vided in section 690.26.
All of such earnings, if necessary for the use of the debtor's family,
residing in this State, and supported in whole or in part by such debtor
unless the debts are: (a) incurred by such debtor, his wife or family,
for the common necessaries of life; or (b) incurred for services ren-
dered by any employee, or former employee, of such debtor.
Legislative History
Code of Civil Procedure section 690.11 is derived from one of
the original sub-sections of section 690, enacted in 1872,2 which pro-
vided for the exemption of:
the earnings of the judgment debtor for his personal services,
rendered at any time within thirty days next preceding the levy of
execution, or levy of attachment, when it appears, by the debtor's affi-
davit or otherwise, that such earnings are necessary for the use of his
family, residing in this State, supported wholly or in part by his labor.
This above-quoted sub-section extended the possibility of exemption
from execution or attachment of all the earnings of the debtor for
* A.B., LL.B. University of California. Staff attorney, Legal Aid Society of San Francisco.
'Statutes exempting property from execution are enacted on the ground of public policy
for the benevolent purpose of saving debtors and their families from want by reason of
misfortune or improvidence. Holmes v. Marshall, 145 Cal. 777, 79 Pac. 534, 104 Am. St. Rep.
86, 2 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 88, 69 L.R.A. 67 (1905).
2 1871-2 Stats., p. 864.
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services rendered within 30 days prior to the levy. However, it left
the burden of proof as to the exemption with the defendant or judg-
ment debtor. It required a showing that he had a family residing in
this state, supported wholly or in part by his labor, and it left him
the burden of showing that all of such earnings were necessary for
the use of his family.
The Code of Civil Procedure Amendment of 1875-76' introduced
the distinguishing concept of the common necessaries of life, adding:
but where debts are incurred by any such person, or his wife or
family, for the common necessaries of life, the one-half of such earn-
ings above mentioned are, nevertheless, subject to execution, garnish-
ment, or attachment to satisfy debts so incurred.
This still only gave protection to a defendant or judgment debtor with
a family residing in this state. It took away the possibility of a
complete exemption if he, his wife, or other member of his family,
incurred a debt for the "common necessaries of life." In such a case
he was required to show one-half of his earnings to be necessary for
current needs, in which case only that one-half would be exempt;
while in the case of a debt for other than common necessaries, if he
could show that all of the earnings were necessary for current needs,
an exemption of both halves of the earnings was allowable. This
system as to the burden of proof remained essentially unchanged until
the 1955 Amendment.
In the present form of the statute, which dates from 1955, if any
defendant or judgment debtor has earnings regardless of the nature
of the debt, and regardless of whether or not he has a family residing
in the state, one-half of his earnings for services rendered 30 days
preceding the levy of attachment or execution are exempt. However,
if the debt is for common necessaries incurred by the debtor, or his
wife, or other member of his family, or if the debtor has no family,
or if there is a family but they are out of state, there is no further
exemption allowed. But if the debt is for other than the common
necessaries of life, and if there is a family and such family is in the
state of California, and if the defendant or judgment debtor maintains
the burden of showing his earnings to be necessary for the current
needs of the family, then an exemption may lie for the full amount
(or at least for the amount necessary for the family).'
'Code Amdts. 1875-6, p. 94.
'It must be remembered that only earnings incurred 30 days preceding the levy are
eligible for exemption. See Le Font v. Rankin, 167 Cal. App. 2d 433, 334 P.2d 608 (1959).
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Basis for and Extent of the Exemption
The case of Perfection Paint Products v. Johnson5 dealt with two
problems: First, how to determine what is necessary for the use of
the debtor's family, viz: what items can be listed on the claim of
exemption, and secondly, what happens if it is ever determined that
all of the earnings are not necessary for the use of the debtor's family?
Mr. Justice Peters, then Presiding Judge of the First District, wrote
the opinion of the court. He stated:6
The basic theory of such exemption is that a debtor and his family,
regardless of the debtor's improvidence, will retain enough money to
maintain a basic standard of living in order that the debtor may have
a fair chance to remain a productive member of the community. The
statute should be liberally construed in order to effectuate this purpose.
But the burden of proof is upon the judgment debtor to establish his
right to such an exemption. In determining whether the debtor has
met this burden of proof the trial court is necessarily vested with wide
discretion. This is so because the determination of what is "necessary
for the use of the debtor's family" is not subject to precise definition,
and differs with each debtor. Thus, the determination must be largely
left to the discretion of the trial court.
Then noting that the trial court had found that the debtor did not
meet the burden of proof as to $38.00 of his earnings, that amount
was held to be subject to execution.
Sanker v. Humborg7 discussed in somewhat more detail the defini-
tion of necessaries, listing prior cases on the subject. It cites and
approves the old case of Evans v. Noonan,' and cites and approves
such applications of the rule as:
1) Proper medical attention
2) Domestic services
3) Services of a nurse
4) A fur coat costing $372.50
5) Dental services
6) Legal services rendered an incompetent wife in restoring her
to competency.
Sanker v. Humborg goes on to uphold the trial court in allowing $5.00
for miscellaneous expenses and recreation, $5.00 a month for music
lessons for the child, and $4.50 for insurance for wife and child.
' 164 Cal. App. 2d 739, 330 P.2d 829 (1958).
6 Id. at 741, 330 P.2d at 830-31.
'48 Cal. App. 2d 205, 119 P.2d 433 (1941).
' 20 Cal. App. 288, 128 Pac. 794 (1912).
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Common Necessaries of Life
Los Angeles Finance Company v. Flores' involved the problem of
defining common necessaries of life."0 The debt was for a gold wrist
watch at the price of $73.77 sold to the defendant's wife for presen-
tation to the defendant as a birthday gift. However, before litigating
the substantive liability of whether this was an article "necessary for
her support," plaintiff caused an attachment to be levied on all of
defendant's earnings. Since this was prior to the 1955 Amendment
of section 690.11 there was no automatic exemption as to the first
one-half of the earnings. Nevertheless, the trial court did allow the
claim for the first half of the earnings, but for that one-half only.
The court had to construe section 690.11 as it then stood. However,
the second paragraph-the matter at issue--was the same prior to
the 1955 Amendment as it is now. It was stipulated by counsel that
if the claim (of plaintiff) was determined to be not for the common
necessaries of life, that the exemption would lie and be granted in full.
The court noted that the word "necessary" was used many times
in the exemption section of the Code of Civil Procedure," while the
exact phrase "common necessaries of life" was used only three times,'"
and only in those provisions which limit the type of debt for which
property of the debtor, otherwise exempt, may nevertheless be levied
upon. The court, overruling a prior case before it,'3 distinguished, on
the one hand, the phrase "necessary wearing apparel" as used in Code
of Civil Procedure section 690.2, as meaning necessary to the partic-
ular debtor considering all the circumstances-his station in life and
his particular type of employment-from, on the other hand, "common
necessaries of life" as used in section 690.11, as meaning those things
which are commonly required for the sustenance of life, regardless of
either employment or status. The court went on to state:14
A tuxedo may be necessary wearing apparel to a waiter at a top-notch
caf6, but not to a laborer who has never attended a type of dinner or
other gathering where tuxedos are customarily worn; and under no
circumstances could it be called a "common necessary of life." The
determination of whether or not a certain article is exempted in the
hands of a debtor under the term "necessary wearing apparel" involves
a determination of whether or not under all the circumstances that
'110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850, 243 P.2d 139 (App. Dept., Super. Ct., Los Angeles, 1952).
"0 In both the prior cases, the nature of the debt was not in issue. Here, as we shall see,
that is the whole issue.
"
1E.g., CAL. CODE CiV. PRoc. §§ 690.2, 690.4.
12 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 690.10, 690.11, 690.20.
1 3 So. Cal. Merchants Assn. v. Thomasen, (1931) Civ. A. 383.
"110 Cal App. 2d Supp. at 856, 243 P.2d at 143.44.
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article is necessary to be worn by that debtor; on the other hand, the
decision of whether or not a certain article previously sold to a debtor
is a common necessary of life so that one-half of the debtor's earnings
of the past 30 days, elsewhere exempted by the statute for the support
of his family, shall nevertheless be taken to pay for it, involves a
determination of whether or not it is such an article that in the hands
of anyone it is to be regarded universally, or substantially so, as neces-
sary to sustain life. Obviously, the Legislature, cognizant of the fact
that to the great majority of persons supporting a family the earnings
of the past 30 days are required for such basic things as food, heat,
shelter, etc. (common to all) desired to make sure that these earnings
shall not be taken to pay for something less basic.
Thus, the debt for Mr. Flores' watch is not a debt for a common
necessary of life; and in case Mr. Flores had a debt for a tuxedo,
that similarly would not be a debt for a common necessary of life.
It so happened that on the facts as given, the debt for Mr. Flores'
watch may not have been a debt for any kind of necessary, 5 nor does
it appear from the facts as given that a tuxedo would have been any
kind of necessary. But these latter considerations do not bear on the
possibility of Mr. Flores' listing them as items of current needs on a
claim of exemption; for, in the items for the claim of exemption,
we consider not the nature of the debt, but the nature of the debtor.
If Mr. Flores had happened to be a waiter, then payments on a
debt for the purchase of a tuxedo (although still not a debt for a
common necessary of life) would be a possible item to list on a claim
of exemption. Similarly, if Mr. Flores had happened to be a time-
keeper, then the debt for the purchase of a watch (and probably even
a gold watch) would be a permissible item to list on a claim of exemp-
tion. But Mr. Flores, as we have knowledge of him (or lack of knowl-
edge), could list neither debt for tuxedo, nor debt for watch, on his
list of current needs for claim of exemption.
For one concerned with seeing a liberal interpretation of exemp-
tion statutes, the trouble with the doctrine of Los Angeles Finance
Company v. Flores does not lie with the results of this case or a case
with the same or similar facts where the nature of the debt is such
that consideration may be given to the situation of the debtor, his
income, number of dependents and current obligations. The difficulty
is limited to the residue of cases wherein the debt is of such a nature,
"5 The court stated ". . . that the defendant had never owned a watch other than this one
nor had any necessity for one; that he had no need for a watch in his work and had never
worn this one at his place of employment except upon one occasion, and at that time acci-
dentally broke the face thereof and had never had it repaired; and he concluded that it was
not practical to wear a wrist watch in his particular work." 110 Cal. App. 2d at 851, 243
P.2d at 140.
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or the debtor is without dependents residing within the state, so that
as to the one-half of the debtor's earnings, other than the one-half
automatically exempt, no consideration may be given to the debtor's
circumstances-neither to his occupation, nor his earning level, nor
even to the number of his dependents.
Should any creditor take precedence over the current needs of
the debtor's children? Or is it that the difficulty is tied to the lack of
legislative clarity as to the meaning of common necessaries? Should
we perhaps specifically enumerate, just as an example, the landlord,
the corner grocer, the family physician who treats an emergency, the
family dentist who remedies an emergency, the family attorney who
secures child support?16
By distinguishing the nature of the debt, the California statute in
effect sets up a priority as to creditors. As for the one-half of the
debtor's earnings which are automatically exempt from garnishment,
we need not concern ourselves; however, for the other one-half of the
salary of the defendant or judgment debtor we have the following set
of priorities-debts:
1) Common necessaries
2) Current needs
3) Other debts.
If the wage earner finds his family in the situation where debts for
common necessaries take priority over his family's current needs for
one-half his salary, he may very well find himself in a situation where
he cannot meet those current needs with the other half left. He may
be left with bankruptcy as the only alternative short of quitting his job,
if he hasn't already been fired as a result of the garnishment, and
separating himself from his family for 90 days or more, so that they
can qualify for Aid to Needy Children. 7
Comparative Exemption Statutes
There is no conformity in American jurisdiction as to the laws
governing exemption of earnings from attachment or execution. The
laws are about as individual as snowflakes. A detailed survey is far
beyond the scope of this article. But a rather grossly over-simplified
classification is instructive as to the range of variation of the statutes
" As to the family attorney who secures child support, see Henry v. Henry, 182 Cal.
App. 2d 707, 6 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1960), overruling Lentfoehr v. Lentfoehr, 134 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 905, 286 P.2d 1019 (App. Dept., Super. Ct., Los Angeles, 1955).
" If his wife chooses to file for divorce or separate maintenance, she can lessen the
waiting period. Assistance to intact families who need income maintenance is only from
County General Relief funds and is often minimal, or even non-existent.
Aug., 1962]
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of several states. The idea of distinguishing as to the nature of the
debt, in determining the basis for exemption of part or all of the
wages, appears only in a very small number of jurisdictions. Evi-
dently, only California, Idaho,'" Montana, 9 Nebraska,2" Nevada, 2'
and Oregon22 consider the nature of the debt in determining the right
to a claim of exemption. The distinction was recently abolished in
New Mexico.23 The special terminology, "common necessaries of life,"
appears only in the laws of California, Nevada, and Montana. Else-
where, probably the more common pattern of exemption is either a
fixed amount or a fixed percentage of the defendant or judgment
debtor's earnings.24 Many other jurisdictions allow for a fixed amount
or a fixed percentage to be exempt only if the defendant or judgment
debtor is the head of a family.25 The state of Florida, however, allows
a complete exemption for the head of a family.26 A few other states
"IDAHO CODE 1947, § 11-205(7): Allowing 75% of earnings to be exempt if necessary
for use of family in the State, but no exemption over 50% if for "actual necessaries."
" MONT. REV. CODE § 93-5816 (1947): Allowing the possibility of complete exemption,
if it is shown that the earnings are necessary for the use of the debtor's family; but where
debts are incurred by such person, or his wife, or family, for gasoline and for the common
necessaries, one-half of the earnings are subject to exemption.
2' NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1557, 1558 (1943) : Wages of heads of families may be exempt
to 90%, but nothing in the Chapter to be construed to exempt property of the value of more
than $500.00 for debts contracted by a person in the purchase of actual necessaries for
himself and his family.
" NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.100(h) (1957): The earnings of the judgment debtor for his
personal services rendered at any time within 30 days next preceding the levy of execution
or attachment where it appears by the debtor's affidavit, or otherwise, that such earnings
are necessary for the care of his family, residing in the State, supported in whole, or in part
by his labor. But where debts are incurred by any such person, or his wife, or family, for
the common necessaries of life, or have been incurred when the debtor had no family resid-
ing in this State, supported in whole, or in part by his labor, the one-half of such earnings
above mentioned, is nevertheless subject to execution, garnishment, or attachment to satisfy
debts so incurred.
22 OR. REV. STAT. § 23.180 (1961) : Earnings up to $175.00 are exempt if necessary for
family, but if debt is for family expenses, then 50% of earnings are subject to execution.
" N. M. STAT. § 26-2-27 (1953) as amended by Ch. 8, Laws 1961 § 1. Now only 25%
of earnings can be garnished (20% if wages under $100.00) unless the debtor is not the
head of a family, or not the head of a family in the State. Previously, there was no such
exemption if the debt was for necessaries.
"4 E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 62 § 73 (1961) : Either $45.00 per week or 5%, whichever is
greater, is exempt and $200.00 per week is the maximum that can be garnished. N. Y. Civ.
PRAc. ACT ch. 684: It is possible to execute only on 10% of earnings and the earnings must
be more than $25.00 or $30.00 a week (depending on the size of the city wherein the debtor
resides). These exemptions in Illinois and New York apply regardless of marital status or
size of family.
2' WASH. REV. CODE § 7.32.280 (1956): Current wages up to $20.00 per week are
exempt if there are family dependents.
2' FLA. STAT. § 222.11 (1961). See Noland Co. v. Linning, 132 So.2d 802 (Fla. 1961)
which put the burden of proof on the creditor to affirmatively aver that the garnishee is not
exempt under the statutes.
[Vol. 14
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allow one percentage, or one amount, of exemption for a single person,
and another percentage, or another amount, for the head of a family."
Alaska,2" Arizona,29 and Kansas3" allow a fixed amount or a fixed
percentage to be exempt upon a showing that such amount or percentage
is necessary for the defendant or judgment debtor's family. The
state of South Carolina allows a complete exemption of wages earned
within 60 days upon showing that the money is necessary for the use
of the family.3
Three states specifically set up a scale for exemption to depend
on the number of dependents. In Iowa the resident head of a family
is allowed an exemption of $35.00 a week plus $3.00 a week for each
dependent under eighteen, but no creditor can garnish for more than
the amount of $150.00, plus costs.32 In Tennessee a single person is
allowed $30.00 exemption; the head of a family is allowed $60.00
exemption and $5.00 for a child and each additional child. 3 An even
more complicated system holds in the state of Wisconsin. 4
As implied above, the great majority of jurisdictions allow garnish-
ment of wages either under a levy of attachment before judgment, or
under a levy of execution after judgment. In the state of Pennsyl-
vania, " on the other hand, all wages in the hands of the employer are
exempt except for debts of under $100.00. In Texas all current wages
are now exempt.3 6 In Massachusetts 7 and New Hampshire3" garnish-
ment is possible only under the procedure of the trustee process.
The Connecticut procedure, 9 under which there is no garnishment
in the form of attachment prior to judgment, is worthy of special
-' E.g., OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2329.62, 2326.66 (1953).
38 ALASKA COMP. L. § 55-9-78 (Cum. Supp. 1958).
Z Aluz. REv. STAT. § 12:1594 (1957) : The amount is one-half.
30 KAN. G. S. 1949, 60-3495.
" CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-1731 (1952). The judge, in applying prop-
erty to execution in his discretion, may order not more than 15o of salary to apply to
judgments for food, fuel, or medicine. The judge must take into special consideration the
needs of the debtor's family, as well as the rights of the creditors. The section shall not
apply to judgments in excess of $100.00.
" IowA CODE § 627-10 (1957).
3 3 TENN. CODE §§ 26-207, 208, 209 (1955).
8' Wis. STAT. § 272.18(15) (1958): Allows a basic exemption of 60% but not less than
$75.00, nor more than $100.00 for each 30-day period. You then add $20.00 per each
dependent, up to a maximum of 85% of the monies.
ar PA. STAT. tit. 42 § 886 (1930).
30 TEX. Crv. STAT. art. 4099 (1960), TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 28. See Smith v. Oak Cliff
Bank & Trust, 99 S.W.2d 1103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) applying these provisions to current
wages when they are uncollected.
37 MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 246 § 28 (1960).
11 N. H. REv. STAT. 512:21 (1955).
11 CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-361 (1958) as amended by 1961 PA. 264, S.8.
Aug., 1962]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
attention. The court, after entry of judgment, as either a part of the
final judgment or a part of the supplementary judgment, may make
the necessary orders for payments to be made by the defendant to
the Clerk of the Court, or in any other manner as the court may deter-
mine, and the money may be disbursed by the Clerk of the Court to
the judgment creditors. "In fixing the amounts to be paid and the
manner of payment, the court may take into consideration the circum-
stances of the defendant, including any other actions pending, or
judgments outstanding against him, the amount of the defendant's
income, and the amount of the claim or demand." Upon necessary
notice and proof of change of circumstances, the order may be changed
or set aside. Upon a showing of the defendant's failure to comply
with the court order, garnishment may be directed, although $25.00
of the defendant's weekly earnings remain exempt even in case gar-
nishment is ordered.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the California law follows the great majority of
American jurisdictions in allowing garnishment of wages both under
a levy of attachment prior to judgment and under a levy of execution
after judgment has been entered. The California law follows a not
uncommon pattern in allowing one-half of the earnings of the defendant
or judgment debtor, rendered for his personal services at any time
within 30 days next preceding the levy, to be automatically exempt.
As to the other one-half of the defendant or judgment debtor's earnings,
a claim for exemption will lie if the showing is made that all of the
earnings are necessary to meet the current needs of the defendant's
family residing in the state of California. But if the defendant or
judgment debtor has no family residing in the state, or if the debt is
incurred for personal services rendered by any employee or former
employee of such debtor, or if the debt is incurred by such debtor,
his wife, or his family for the common necessaries of life, there is no
exemption beyond the automatic exemption of one-half of the earnings.
The concept of a debt for common necessaries of life as set forth
and defined in the admirably liberal case of Los Angeles Finance
Company v. Flores not only places California within a slim minority
of jurisdictions wherein the nature of the debt has bearing on the
eligibility for exemption from garnishment, but further refines the
distinction. The possibility of extending protection to current wages
of wage earners with families in California, under the authority of
Code of Civil Procedure section 690.11, is so interpreted as to give
[Vol. 14
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full priority to all the current needs of the wage earner only if the
debts are not for the common necessaries.
When the debt is for the common necessaries, whatever current
needs can be met out of the one-half of the debtor's salary automatically
exempt, of course take priority-but whatever current needs cannot
be met out of that one-half are just not going to be met regardless of
how small the debtor's salary may be and regardless of how many
dependents he may have. The debtor thus is left under California
law with the burden of: 1) facing garnishment in the form of attach-
ment prior to the judgment, 2) the burden of proving the debt is not
for the common necessaries of life, 3) and even if the debt is not
for the common necessaries of life, the burden of proving he needs
all of his salary for his family.
Obviously, if these burdens are too great, the judgment debtor still
has open to him the alternative of bankruptcy. But, for every such
debtor (and perhaps the number is already too great) who seeks the
remedy of bankruptcy, how many are there who follow the path of
separation and family break-up, leaving children economically and
emotionally deprived instead of being members of a cohesive and self-
supporting family?
Aug., 19621
